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Abstract: As the official historian for 
the Canadian Army in the Second World 
War, C.P. Stacey understood both the 
benefits and limitations of oral history. 
This is especially evident within his 
work on the Dieppe narratives which 
shaped a portion of the Canadian 
Army’s Official History. Dieppe was 
Stacey’s first foray into report writing 
and though his use of oral testimony 
related to circumstances rather than 
a methodological preference and he 
remained aware of its limitations, he 
nevertheless employed it throughout the 
narratives. It is clear that oral testimony 
was central to the narratives and 
provided otherwise irretrievable pieces 
of information. This study examines 
the narratives in conjunction with 
Stacey’s war diaries, memoirs, and other 
secondary sources to determine the 
extent to which oral testimony was used 
in addition to how and when it was used, 
especially in the case of sensitive issues 
involving Dieppe’s contentious legacy. 
Operation Jubilee, the raid on the port of Dieppe, proved one of 
the most disastrous episodes for the 
Canadian Army during the Second 
World War. On 19 August 1942, a 
force of approximately 5,000 men 
from the 2nd Canadian Division 
under the command of Major-General 
John Hamilton Roberts attempted to 
seize the German-occupied port to 
destroy military infrastructure and 
acquire intelligence by capturing 
prisoners and documents.1 Of the 
4,658 who embarked on the operation, 
only 2,210 returned to England. The 
Canadians suffered 3,367 casualties 
including 1,946 prisoners of war.2 
The task of documenting this 
disaster fell to Major Charles Perry 
Stacey, the historical officer at 
Canadian Military Headquarters. 
S tacey ’ s  job  was  to  compi le 
information for official histories 
to be written at the war’s end. He 
undertook the task by drafting a 
series of “narratives,” detailed, 
heavily referenced factual accounts 
based on the fullest information he 
could gather.3 In the case of Dieppe, 
Stacey, and historical officers under 
his command who arrived in 1942, 
produced no fewer than 15 narratives 
by the end of the European war, 
each incorporating new bodies of 
information that came to hand. These 
narratives are of particular interest 
because they represent Stacey’s 
first attempt to capture information 
on a major battle, one that was 
immediately controversial, and, 
because of the scope of the disaster 
and losses, whose documentary 
record was incomplete. For this latter 
reason, Stacey for the first time relied 
on oral accounts, which were central 
to the development of the Dieppe 
narratives. This was Stacey’s first 
experience in creating and using oral 
history materials. By using records of 
interviews from Stacey’s war diary 
and the Dieppe narratives, this paper 
traces the role of oral testimony in 
Stacey’s account of tank operations, 
one of the key aspects of the operation 
for which there was little or no 
written evidence because of heavy 
casualties.4
C.P. Stacey is best remembered as 
the official historian for the Canadian 
army during the Second World 
War, but he was not appointed to 
this position until the autumn of 
1945.5 At the time of the Dieppe 
raid, Stacey’s chief task as head of 
the historical section at Canadian 
Military Headquarters (CMHQ) 
was to “prepare material for the 
official historian…and further 
document the war effort by collecting 
historical evidence ‘not otherwise 
available.’”6 In 1940, then Major-
General H.D.G. Crerar, chief of the 
general staff in Ottawa, arranged 
Stacey’s appointment as the overseas 
historical officer to supervise the 
collection process and avoid the 
“disaster” of the Great War official 
history program.7 Many officers at 
CMHQ in London initially distrusted 
Stacey. They refused to believe that 
the authorities in Ottawa would 
send an officer solely to conduct 
historical work, and considered 
him a “spy for National Defence 
headquarters.”8 Colonel G.R. Turner, 
general staff officer, 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division,  considered 
sharing operational information in 
the planning stages a “dangerous 
practice,” and worried that “this 
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pesky chronicler would ‘practically 
be at the Commander’s elbow.’”9 
However, Stacey quickly developed 
a positive working relationship with 
General Andrew McNaughton, 
commander of the Canadian Army 
overseas from 1939 to 1943, and 
General Crerar, who came overseas 
in December 1941, and in early 1944 
succeeded McNaughton in command 
of the Canadian Army. McNaughton, 
like Crerar whom he had mentored 
since they first served together during 
the First World War, had a scholarly 
turn of mind and understood the 
nature and role of official history. 
This positive relationship with the 
senior commanders allowed Stacey 
considerable access to classified 
files and to key individuals in the 
British as well as the Canadian 
forces, and to such senior civilians 
as Vincent Massey, the Canadian 
High Commissioner in London, and 
his staff.10 General McNaughton 
“took Stacey into his confidence” 
discussing high-level policy with 
the historian, and allowing access 
to his personal files under condition 
that Stacey exercise discretion with 
the information. This relationship 
proved greatly beneficial, as Stacey 
was able to “invoke” the general’s 
name to gain access to necessary 
records or interviewing “recalcitrant 
individuals.”11
At the time of his appointment, 
Stacey was a relatively young 
academic; he had completed his 
doctorate at Princeton in 1933. 
Al though much of  h is  work, 
including his dissertation, dealt 
with the nineteenth century, he had 
always been interested in current 
military subjects and his book The 
Military Problems of Canada, written 
in 1938-40 on current issues in 
defence policy, brought him to 
Crerar’s attention, then commandant 
at the Royal Military College.12 
From the time Stacey arrived in 
England in December 1940 until 
late 1942, he had few resources at 
his command and conducted much 
of the work himself. In addition to 
developing the narratives, Stacey had 
to personally ensure that the army 
created and preserved the records 
he, and the yet unnamed official 
historian, required. He visited units 
stationed across England, constantly 
reminding officers of the need to write 
comprehensive unit war diaries, and 
to retain orders, communications 
logs, conference notes and other 
material that explained the unit’s 
development and activities.13 Stacey 
received no directives from senior 
officers concerning what materials 
he should assemble and how he 
should do it. The use of oral accounts 
in the case of the Dieppe narratives 
was a pragmatic response to a 
difficult situation. These narratives 
represented a steep learning curve 
that he later described as “the 
heaviest job of historical research that 
fell to me during the war. [P]utting 
together documented narratives of 
[the Dieppe operation] took up all the 
time I could spare for the better part 
of two years.”14 
At the time of the raid, Stacey 
was on privilege leave in Edinburgh 
and only learned of the attack as it 
occurred. He remarked in his diary 
that he had “chosen a bad time to 
go on leave” and contacted CMHQ 
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Perry Stacey, photographed here in London during the 
war, was the head of the historical section at Canadian Military Headquarters. In that 
capacity he was responsible for drafting a series of narratives on the Dieppe Raid.
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to determine if he was required 
back in London.15 Though CMHQ 
saw little reason for his return, 
Stacey came back on 21 August to 
“start work on what was clearly 
going to be a big job.”16 Having 
been entirely left “out of the loop,” 
Stacey had to be resourceful and 
determined in acquiring information. 
Stacey discussed arrangements 
with Brigadier Churchill Mann, 
brigadier general staff, 1st Division 
Headquarters, to interview survivors, 
which Mann granted on 24 August 
1942 . 17 Canadian  and Br i t i sh 
authorities subjected Stacey to intense 
pressure over the issue of assigning 
responsibility in creating the initial 
drafts of the Dieppe narratives.18 
Stacey faced a daunting task 
creating narratives due to incomplete 
evidence. For example, only one 
member of the armoured unit landed 
at Dieppe, the 14th Calgary Tank 
Regiment, returned to England in 
the immediate aftermath of the raid. 
Stacey noted in his war diary that 
“the tank story…[was] difficult to 
reconstruct.”19 Stacey spent months 
of painstaking work piecing together 
the events. There were a few written 
reports by returning non-armour 
officers from other units who had 
witnessed the activities of the Calgary 
tanks, and these he fleshed out 
by interviewing personnel of the 
Calgary Regiment who managed to 
escape from France, or who were later 
repatriated from German captivity on 
medical grounds. 
Stacey’s memoirs and personal 
f i les  provide ample evidence 
regarding his view of oral history. 
Though his opinion is often negative, 
he does concede that such evidence is 
valuable and often necessary in cases 
where there is a lack of other sources. 
Stacey’s attitudes reflect a “middle 
ground” compared to his American 
and British counterparts. While the 
Americans were “pioneers” in oral 
history, conducting experiments to 
determine when a soldier’s memory 
became corrupted, the British 
disdained oral testimony, focusing 
entirely on written records.20 Stacey’s 
chief concern with oral accounts was 
the amount of time between incident 
and interview. Though he did not 
necessarily agree with an American 
conclusion that the maximum period 
was six days, he did concede that the 
validity of an account “is directly 
related to the length of time that 
elapsed between the event and the 
moment when the account was 
written or the interview took place.” 
Stacey had “no hesitation in saying 
that one scrap of paper written on 
the evening of the battle is worth 
reams of reminiscence written down 
or spoken into tape recorders after 
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months or years have passed. The 
best historical evidence is evidence 
recorded at the time [emphasis in 
original].”21
G a p s  i n  e v i d e n c e  o f t e n 
necess i ta ted  in terv iews  long 
after the event occurred. Though 
Stacey conducted such interviews, 
he cautioned that they should be 
done only “when the contemporary 
evidence fails you” and they are 
carefully checked against available 
written records.22 His greatest 
concern in this regard was the 
“unintentional liar.” Though Stacey 
seldom encountered a deliberate liar, 
many of those he came across had 
undergone traumatic experiences. 
Prisoners of war who had spent 
“years behind the barbed wire, 
brooding about the experiences, 
convincing themselves that things 
had happened which in fact never 
took place, and perhaps cherishing 
grudges against people whom they 
considered responsible for their 
plight.” Others were officers who “felt 
they had been hard done by, and…
built up myths in their own minds 
about those whom they considered 
the authors of their misfortunes.” 
Some individuals experienced 
a “sea-change” in memory over 
time, becoming “dedicated to their 
misconceptions, and refused to be 
convinced by contrary evidence, 
however overwhelming.”23 Stacey 
freely offered similar advice, notably 
to an historian who asked for guidance 
on a book concerning “the human 
side of the war in Northwest Europe” 
that included 460 interviews with 
veterans from across the country.24 
“All my experience as a historian,” 
Stacey responded, “indicates that 
interviews based on the memories 
of individuals are very much less 
reliable than the contemporary 
documents. And when the memories 
are forty years old they are often very 
misleading.”25 
In his opinion, operations logs 
were “superior to all others as a 
source of information.” The log 
contained timed entries concerning 
information received and sent out. 
Since officers did not create the log for 
historical purposes, it was impersonal 
and contemporary. Availability of 
the logbook allowed a historian to 
reconstruct a unit’s part in a battle 
with confidence – and the absence 
of such a log left the researcher 
“hamstrung.”26
Stacey did not leave notes 
detailing his interview process, but 
combining statements from his war 
diary with his memoirs provides 
some insight. In his memoirs, Stacey 
stated that in preparing, one should 
begin by “reading the written 
evidence before the interview. In 
that way [the historian] will not 
only be able to assess the value 
of what he is being told, but he 
will be equipped to prompt the 
person he is interviewing.”27 After 
this preparation, Stacey conducted 
several interviews with a subject, then 
draft a comprehensive memorandum 
that aimed at capturing the subject’s 
complete testimony. Stacey asked 
the subject to review the memo 
and make any necessary changes 
before signing the document to 
attest to its veracity. In his war diary, 
Stacey recorded his impression of 
the testimony individuals provided 
during interviews. An example is his 
reflections on Captain G.A. Browne 
of the Royal Canadian Artillery 
and Lieutenant A.A. Masson of the 
Fusiliers Mont-Royal, who escaped 
from German captivity and returned 
to England 27 January 1943. Stacey 
took the two officers to lunch and 
set up interviews that took place 
three days later.28 Stacey noted that 
while Lieutenant Masson was “not 
a very satisfactory witness” having 
a “tendency to change his evidence 
when ‘cross-examined,’” Captain 
Browne was “a first-rate witness, 
whose written report is a remarkable 
piece of observation.” Of Browne, 
Stacey remarked, “this officer should 
go far.”29 
Stacey began his work on the 
Dieppe raid by interviewing survivors 
almost immediately after his return 
from Scotland, suggesting he fully 
realized the importance of oral 
testimonies.30 Shortly after the raid, 
Stacey visited Captains Cameron and 
Alexander of the 14th Army Tank 
Regiment (The Calgary Regiment) 
to underscore the importance of 
the unit’s war diary given the 
absence of returning personnel.31 
Nevertheless, when on 31 May 
1943, Stacey reviewed 2nd Division 
documents slated for destruction 
he discovered an operational order 
not included in the tank regiment’s 
war diary. There were no known 
copies of the order before Stacey’s 
discovery, despite its importance 
as the only written operational 
order for any participating unit.32 
The war diary did include several 
key pieces of evidence, notably 
about the difficulties the stony beach 
created for the tracked vehicles. 
The tank commanded by Captain 
A.G. Stanton, adjutant of the 14th 
Army Tank Regiment immediately 
bogged down in the loose shale, 
preventing other armoured units 
from exiting the landing craft. The 
war diary provided some detail on 
the unit’s combat experience during 
the raid, leading Stacey to conclude, 
“all tanks which got ashore fought 
very hard until either out of action 
or out of ammunition.”33 The total 
approximate losses for the regiment 
were 17 officers and 153 other ranks 
along with 28 tanks and 7 scout cars.34 
There was, however, a paucity of 
detail in the diary because “only two 
members of the total tank crews on 
shore managed to get away and the 
remainder were either killed or taken 
prisoner.”35 
The early Dieppe narratives 
contain very little information about 
tank operations. CMHQ report no.83 
written in September 1942 indicated 
that “The first wave of tanks came 
under heavy fire as soon as they 
came out of the landing craft, and 
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while some immediately got on to 
the boulevard in front of the town 
and penetrated further, others did not 
get off the beach.”36 Casualties among 
engineering personnel assigned to 
breach a sea wall with explosives or 
timber ramps prevented many tanks 
from leaving the beach.37 Despite 
the fact that a number of the tanks 
were immobilized by damage, they 
“continued to fight [sic] their guns 
with the greatest courage, engaging 
the batteries which were firing on 
the landing craft.”38 At 1100 hours 
an order was given to abandon the 
tanks in order to re-embark surviving 
personnel. 
The importance of interviews 
in shaping the Dieppe narratives 
is evident in CMHQ report no.89 
written in December 1942. Interviews 
with individuals who escaped were 
a “valuable supplement” to written 
evidence provided by returnees 
and unit war diaries. These oral 
accounts provided information of the 
operation “not available otherwise.”39 
Unfortunately, the escapees included 
no armoured personnel, but some 
additional details emerged from 
the evidence of soldiers from other 
branches. Several factors hindered 
Stacey’s attempt to reconstruct 
the activities of the Calgary tanks. 
Besides the lack of  returning 
personnel to interview, those who 
managed to escape and return to 
England had little contact with tank 
survivors while in captivity.40 Much 
of the evidence concerning tank 
operations centered on instances in 
which infantrymen and engineers 
encountered tanks during the raid, 
and provided only momentary 
glimpses. Sergeant G.A. Dickson 
of the Royal Canadian Engineers 
testified that at least five tanks had 
reached the esplanade (sea-wall), and 
that at least three tanks managed to 
reach the town, last seen moving west 
on la Rue de la Barre.41
Private J. Maier of the Essex 
Scottish stated that all three tanks on 
Landing Craft Tank 4 had managed 
to land, and that one tank (Burns) had 
its track broken by enemy fire after 
crossing through one wire barrier, 
to open a path for the infantry.42 
Maier also stated that four tanks were 
“patrolling” on the road immediately 
above the sea-wall and firing on 
enemy positions but were unable 
to provide cover fire for an infantry 
advance. Despite broken tracks 
and shell hits, the tanks kept up 
continuous fire, with some still in 
action at the time of evacuation.43 
A medical  repatr iat ion of 
prisoners from Dieppe in late October 
1943 provided Stacey with a further 
opportunity to fill gaps in his account. 
He particularly hoped that Major 
C.E. Page, the most senior officer of 
the Calgary Regiment to get ashore, 
and Corporal T.L. Carnie of the 
Calgary Regiment could “add to our 
knowledge of the action of tanks.”44 
On 29 October 1943, Stacey arrived 
at Taplow hospital in Maidenhead to 
interview Major Page and Corporal 
Carnie. Carnie was wounded in the 
eye by shrapnel shortly after landing 
and was unable to provide any details 
on the operation.45 Stacey’s discussion 
Stacey had trouble trying to accurately tell the story of the Calgary Tanks in 
his early narratives of the raid as most those who landed became casualties 
and so few men from the regiment returned to England.
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with Major Page proved much more 
helpful in reconstructing the activities 
of the Calgary tanks. Page’s detailed 
testimony “considerably alter[ed] 
the picture” of tank operations.46 
Page indicated that he knew of no 
tanks having penetrated into Dieppe 
proper, though approximately 15 
tanks had crossed the sea-wall with 
a majority later returning to the 
beach. Eighteen tanks had their 
tracks broken by shellfire with an 
additional four tanks immobilized by 
the chert beach.47 Heavy German fire 
was unable to effectively penetrate 
the Calgary tanks, and the unit did 
not incur casualties from anti-tank 
shells. As the result of its reliability, 
all the men in Page’s unit were 
“absolutely sold on” the Churchill 
tank. Page was also certain that the 
raid had caused “numerous” German 
casualties (though no precise number 
was mentioned).48 The following day 
Stacey returned to CMHQ and drafted 
a memorandum of his interview with 
Page.49 He then began to consider the 
many changes to the narratives this 
new information made necessary.50 
In November 1943, Major Page 
visited Stacey in his office at CMHQ 
to certify the accuracy of the draft 
memorandum. This meeting became 
a follow-up interview, as Page 
provided the names of 13 tanks he 
was certain had breached the sea 
wall along with two “probables.”51 
There is  no indication of any 
subsequent interviews with Major 
Page suggesting certification of the 
final copy of the memorandum at this 
meeting. In the days following this 
interview, Stacey began a thorough 
review of the Dieppe narratives. On 
10 November, he began to edit the 
second section of the record “in the 
light of new evidence.”52 Later in the 
month, Stacey drafted CMHQ report 
107 summarizing the interviews he 
conducted over the previous month. 
This report addressed a key issue 
– namely, the number of tanks that 
managed to reach the esplanade. The 
description in this report provided a 
great amount of detail in contrast to 
earlier accounts:
Although Major Page confirms that 
some tanks were certainly knocked 
out on the central part of the beach, 
where the esplanade was high, while 
moving laterally and searching for 
a way to cross the wall, he is quite 
certain that 12 to 15 tanks crossed 
the wall in the end sectors where it 
was low. The majority of these tanks 
had returned to the beach by about 
0900 hrs. The reason for this return 
was the fact that the tanks could get 
some cover there from the guns sited 
in the East Cliff, while moreover 
they “could get better shooting from 
there.” This accounts for the large 
concentration of tanks on the beach 
north-east corner of the Casino, 
an area which seemed especially 
favourable.53 
This new oral evidence also 
demanded Stacey re-examine early 
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These two photos show Churchill tanks abandoned at Dieppe. In late 1943 men from 
the Calgary Tanks were repatriated to England as a result of their wounds and were 
able to provide Stacey with a more complete picture of tanks’ employment at Dieppe.
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copies of reports 108 and 109.54 
Though earlier drafts were not 
included in Stacey’s personal papers, 
the end result discussed earlier 
suggests the important role oral 
testimony played in shaping the 
Dieppe narratives. 
In May 1944, one month before 
the Overlord invasion, Canadian 
military intelligence sent a number 
of translated German documents 
concerning the Dieppe raid to Stacey 
at CMHQ.55 There was no clear 
indication as to how the documents 
fell into allied hands. Stacey thought 
it probable that “they were captured 
by allied troops in North Africa or 
Italy.”56 The documents addressed 
issues concerning pre-operation 
security and the element of surprise, 
the composition of the German 
defenders and German casualties. 
There was a concern that the invasion 
force’s unexpected contact with a 
German convoy had alerted shore 
forces of the allied presence. The 
German combat report stated, “the 
entire coast defence system was 
alerted,” though Stacey suggested 
this passage was inserted in an 
effort to “gloss over the fact that 
this alert was not wholly general, 
if this was in fact the case.”57 The 
report also detailed the number of 
German casualties. Earlier narratives 
had simply stated that the Germans 
had suffered “many” casualties 
without providing a precise number. 
Unfortunately for Stacey, the report 
contained several differing totals. A 
combat report submitted by the 302nd 
Infantry Division (which presumably 
contained al l  totals  from the 
operation) cited 67 killed (all ranks), 
10 missing, and 167 wounded.58 This 
differed greatly with the 440 total 
casualties cited in an Organization 
Todt report and significantly differed 
from the German High Command’s 
claims of 591 casualties.59
These discrepancies led Stacey 
to ponder why German authorities 
would falsify the figures. Though it 
was “surprising” Stacey suggested 
CMHQ and AHQ Reports on Dieppe
The Directorate of History and Heritage has digitized the valuable collection of 
CMHQ and AHQ reports written by C.P. Stacey and the other historians of his 
historical section. The reports can be found at: http://bit.ly/RBpMYj
CMHQ Report no.83 (19 September 1942)
Preliminary Report on Operation “JUBILEE” (The Raid on Dieppe) 19 Aug 42.
CMHQ Report no.89 (31 December 1942)
The Operation at Dieppe, 19 Aug 42: Personal Stories of Participants.
CMHQ Report no.90 (18 February 1943)
The Operation at Dieppe, 19 Aug 42: Further Personal Stories of Participants.
CMHQ Report no.98 (15 July 1943)
Article Dealing with the Operation at Dieppe, 19 Aug 42.
CMHQ Report no.100 (16 July 1943)
Operation “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part I: Preliminaries.
CMHQ Report no.101 (11 August 1943)
Operation “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the 
Operation. Section 1: General Outline and Flank Attacks.
CMHQ Report no.107 (29 November 1943)
The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42: Further Personal Stories of Participants.
CMHQ Report no.108 (17 December 1943)
Operation “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the 
Operation. Section 2: The Attack on the Main Beaches.
CMHQ Report no.109 (17 December 1943)
Operation “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part III: Special Aspects.
CMHQ Report no.116 (10 May 1944)
Operation “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. 
Additional Information from German Sources.
CMHQ Report no.128 (20 November 1944)
The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42. Some New Information.
CMHQ Report no.130 (27 November 1944)
The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42: Pictorial and Cartographical Material.
CMHQ Report no.142 (18 July 1945)
Operation “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Further New Information.
CMHQ Report no.153 (22 March 1946)
Operation “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe , 19 Aug 42. New Light on Early Planning
CMHQ Report no.159 (5 October 1946)
Operation “JUBILEE”: The Raid on Dieppe 19 Aug 42. 
Additional Information on Planning.
AHQ Report no.10 (5 December 1946)
Operation “Jubilee”: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42 (Info from German War Diaries)
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“The development of the German defences in the Dieppe sector
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that “it might be dangerous…if only 
from the point of view of morale, 
to have it known in the Army that 
the figures of loesses [sic] given to 
the public were notably different 
from the truth.” He thought it 
conceivable “that figures of losses 
circulated in a document like the 
Combat Report now under review 
might be altered before circulation.” 
This was especially the case given 
“the impression left with Canadian 
prisoners after the operation is that 
the Germans in fact has [sic] suffered 
greatly.”60 Statistical divergences in 
the captured German files frustrated 
Stacey who thought it possible that 
“we shall never receive a completely 
reliable account of the German losses 
at DIEPPE.”61 Post war analysis of 
German war diaries suggested that 
the figures had not been misstated 
in the earlier intelligence intercepts 
leading Stacey to conclude that 
“German casualties, at least so far as 
ground troops are concerned, were 
actually smaller than were heretofore 
have been prepared to concede.”62 
A report from the Commander in 
Chief West cited the total losses 
as 591 men – identical to a High 
Command official communiqué that 
“forced … the conclusion that the C. 
in C. West was more concerned with 
maintaining uniformity with the 
story already published than with 
producing a completely accurate 
statement.”63 Given discrepancies 
and shortcomings in written reports, 
oral testimony played an important 
role in Stacey’s reconstruction. 
These German reports also 
corroborated the testimony of Major 
Page on key points – the number 
of tanks crossing the sea wall and 
the durability of the Churchill tank. 
German sources estimated the number 
of tanks that reached the Esplanade 
as sixteen in total, a number similar 
to Page’s claim. German fire was 
also generally unable to pierce the 
Churchill’s armour. Though two 37 
mm shell holes had been found in 
the tanks left on the beach after the 
raid, German reports concluded that 
both greater numbers and heavier 
calibre anti-tank weapons would 
be required to effectively penetrate 
enemy armour. This supports Page’s 
statements asserting the Churchill 
tank’s satisfactory performance.64 
On 1 September 1944,  the 
reconnaissance regiment of the 
2nd Canadian Infantry Division 
occupied the town of Dieppe as 
part of operation Fusilade. The 
plan had originally called for heavy 
bomber strikes and significant naval 
bombardment.65 Such preparations 
proved unnecessary as the Germans 
“chose to abandon Dieppe without 
a fight.”66 The first tasks for the 
Canadians was to rest and conduct 
a remembrance ceremony at the 
graveyard containing casualties from 
the August 1942 attack followed by a 
ceremonial march through the town 
by the original participating units. 
An abandoned Churchil is examined by a German soldier after the raid.
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Stacey was present [on an historical 
liaison trip to the army in the field?] 
described the affair as “moving.”67 
This occupation was not simply for 
sentimental reasons as it provided 
an opportunity for the Canadians to 
examine Dieppe’s defences, which 
the Germans had significantly 
expanded since 1942. It was possible 
to determine the degree of growth by 
comparing recent aerial photos to an 
earlier defence overprint.68 
Postwar repatriations provided 
Stacey with valuable sources. Several 
former prisoners provided testimony 
affording “interesting additions 
to our knowledge of the Dieppe 
operation” but Stacey cautioned 
the official historian against “taking 
(these accounts) in all respects 
precisely at their face value” as 
officers who had been prisoners of 
war “were not in possession of the 
full facts concerning the results of the 
operation (Dieppe).”69 Interestingly 
Stacey related a comment by a 
Lieutenant Lee to the effect that 
“every P.W is always extremely 
bitter.” The general perception of 
those in prisoner camps was “liable 
to be coloured by circumstances.”70 
The war’s conclusion did not end 
the work on the Dieppe narratives. 
Controversies developing in the post-
war period would greatly influence 
the perception of the Calgary tanks 
operational performance. Lieutenant-
Colonel Robert Ridley Labatt, former 
prisoner of war and commander of 
the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry 
during the Dieppe raid visited Ottawa 
after the conclusion of hostilities to 
provide his personal commentary 
on the Dieppe narratives.71 Labatt 
asserted that only three tanks had 
reached the esplanade at any time 
during the operation.72 With such 
a divergence in testimony, Stacey’s 
wrote to other recently repatriated 
officers of the Calgary Regiment 
who had served at Dieppe for further 
information: Captain Edwin Bennett 
and Lieutenant A.L. Breithaupt. He 
used these officers’ written reports 
acquired along with Major C.E. 
Page’s oral account ascertaining the 
actions of tanks at Dieppe. Stacey 
noted that responses by both Captain 
Bennett and Lieutenant Breithaupt 
generally supported the earlier oral 
testimony provided by Major Page.73 
Breithaupt recalled, “13 or 15 tanks 
had crossed the sea wall and reached 
the Esplanade … Most of these tanks 
with the exception of the few that 
were knocked out on the Esplanade…
return[ed] to the beach on the order 
of withdrawal.” 74 The written 
statements of these two officers in 
conjunction with Major Page’s oral 
account “appear[ed] to establish 
definitively the number of tanks 
which crossed the wall.” Stacey’s 
views concerning the “unintentional 
liar” outlined in his memoirs likely 
emerged as the result of incidents 
such as this. 
The result of this debate found its 
way into CMHQ Report no.142 which 
addressed several issues centering on 
testimony of former prisoners of war. 
The description of tank actions in the 
report strongly reflected Major Page’s 
testimony:
Second Canadian Infantry Division makes a triumphant return to Dieppe, 3 September 1944.
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initial landing of three L.C.T.s 
[Landing Craft Tanks] approximately 
on time (nine tanks), a dry landing, 
moved up shingle but stopped by 
anti-tank ditch. About this time one 
troop from first flight was able to 
reach promenade at extreme east and 
near harbour jetty where they came 
under heavy fire from cliffs. One 
tank reached promenade on extreme 
west end of promenade and came 
under heavy fire. Town could not be 
entered due to road blocks and these 
tanks tried to neutralize observed 
enemy positions from promenade. 
They also tried road blocks on their 
own without success. Consequently 
tanks were confined to promenade 
and beach. Approximately eighteen 
tanks had racks knocked out by fire 
but the interior of tanks were not 
effected [sic] by fire. Subsequently 
out of remainder of battalion, eleven 
tanks reached shore making in all 
twenty nine tanks. Many L.C.T.s 
sunk. No tanks were evacuated. 
Commanding Officer of Battalion 
was killed. Intercommunication was 
good throughout within [sic] tank 
battalion but communication with 
infantry useless.75
In addressing the issue of the 
numbers and operational use of tanks 
at Dieppe, oral history proved a key 
source. In 1946, Stacey conducted 
interviews with both Captain 
Hughes-Hallett and Brigadier A.H. 
Head for insights on planning.76 
Stacey conducted these interviews in 
an effort to determine why planners 
chose a frontal assault. A lack of 
“strictly contemporary written 
evidence” gave the interviews 
increased importance.77 
In the first volume of the official 
histories, Stacey dedicated an entire 
section to “The Fortunes of the 
Tanks.” There were many reasons 
the activities of the 14th Army Tank 
Regiment’s performance at Dieppe 
was important. It was the first unit 
of the Canadian Armoured Corps 
to see action, the first battle for the 
Churchill tank as well as the first 
amphibious landing of tanks under 
combat conditions. The interview 
with Major Page played a prominent 
role. Stacey used this information 
in detailing the number of tanks in 
operation and reconstructing their 
activity once ashore. In all, 29 tanks 
exited the landing crafts with 27 
successfully landing.78 Once the tanks 
had landed, they immediately faced 
a sea-wall only surmountable at the 
extreme ends which rose only two 
feet above the beach. A track-laying 
device created by a Major B. Sucharov 
was to assist the tanks in crossing the 
rocky beach facilitated this, but he 
developed the chespaling track for 
a beach with a different composition 
to the chert rock at Dieppe.79 Plans 
for the construction of timber ramps 
allowing tanks to breach the wall in 
the centre could not be built given 
the heavy casualties sustained by 
Canadian engineers resulting from 
heavy German fire. Heavy concrete 
roadblocks barred the streets leading 
from the Promenade into the centre 
of the town, effectively refusing 
entry to the tanks. These obstacles 
remained intact due to casualties, 
lost equipment, and non-landed 
demolition personnel.80 
Major Page’s testimony provided 
the basis for much of this section. 
81 Though Page was certain that 13 
had successfully crossed the wall 
(along with two “probable”), his 
testimony along with correspondence 
with Lieutenant Bennett established 
that 15 tanks had crossed the wall.82 
Stacey dismissed claims by some 
infantry commanders (Lieutenant-
Colonel Labatt for example) who 
provided “much lower estimates 
of the number that reached the 
Promenade” by emphasizing that 
“the evidence of the men who were 
in the tanks was conclusive.”83 The 
accounts provided by Page and 
Bennett were supported by captured 
German files from the 81st Corps held 
that “‘probably 16’ tanks crossed the 
Promenade.”84 Major Page’s evidence 
also confirmed the “staunchness” 
of the Churchill tank. The tank’s 
armour “gave complete protection” 
from the German’s 37 mm anti-tank 
fire, suffering only 13 fatal casualties 
during the operation.85 The lack of 
returning personnel was explained 
by the fact that the tanks “continued 
firing, operating in effect as pillboxes, 
and effectively supporting the 
infantry” until long after evacuations 
ceased. Infantrymen who witnessed 
the actions of the tanks “speak in 
the warmest terms of the manner in 
which they fought.”86 
The off ic ia l  histor ies  a lso 
reflect the difficulties Stacey had in 
reconstructing the activities of the 
Calgary tanks. “Information about 
the tanks’ action was long very 
meager, chiefly because only one man 
(Trooper G. Volk) who had been in a 
tank on shore returned to England. 
Only when our first prisoners were 
repatriated (on medical grounds) 
in 1943 did the real facts begin to 
emerge.”87 Many of these “real facts” 
relied upon oral testimony. 
The creation of the Dieppe 
narratives and the role of the 
Calgary tank regiment therein 
represented severa l  years  o f 
methodical and painstaking research. 
In reconstructing the activities of 
tanks during Operation Jubilee, 
Stacey employed a mixture of 
oral testimony, allied planning 
documents, war diaries, written 
testimony, and captured German 
files. The testimony of Major Page 
proved important in establishing 
key facts concerning the number of 
tanks that managed to breach the 
sea-wall that withstood contrary 
claims with assistance of written 
evidence supplied by other tank 
officers who participated in the raid. 
In his memoirs, Stacey advocated 
a very cautious view regarding the 
efficacy of oral testimony, believing 
such sources were best used in cases 
where no documentary sources 
existed, and that there was an inverse 
relationship between elapsed time 
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and the accuracy of an interview. In 
spite of these reservations, Stacey 
made effective use of oral testimony 
in examining the role of tanks in 
creating the Dieppe narratives. The 
lack of returning personnel from the 
Calgary Tank Regiment left a gap in 
documentary evidence elevating the 
importance of oral testimony. Under 
pressure and lacking resources and 
directives, the young C.P. Stacey 
sought to collect as much information 
for the yet to be appointed official 
historian to use in the future official 
histories. To this end, Stacey created 
a series of narratives in which the 
oral testimony of individuals such as 
Major Page played a vital role. 
Stacey’s impact on the writing of 
military history goes beyond his role 
in shaping the Dieppe narratives into 
the official histories as a whole though 
much work remains to be done to 
determine the extent of this influence. 
After-action reporting and the 
interviewing of returned personnel is 
now common practice and historians 
through the Directorate of History 
and Heritage make extensive use 
of war diaries and oral testimony 
in crafting their narratives. Oral 
history is increasingly playing an 
important role in military history 
as evidenced by the University of 
Victoria’s ever-expanding catalogue 
of interviews with veterans and 
proves and invaluable source for 
researchers. Though gaps remain 
to be filled on this topic, Colonel 
Charles Perry Stacey’s influence on 
the writing of military history and 
use of oral sources is evident.
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